Finding A Path for Children in United States lmmigration Law by Russell, Ryan D.
Seton Hall University
eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law
5-1-2014
Finding A Path for Children in United States
lmmigration Law
Ryan D. Russell
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Recommended Citation
Russell, Ryan D., "Finding A Path for Children in United States lmmigration Law" (2014). Law School Student Scholarship. 561.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/561
Introduction 
 
Child welfare laws in the United States have evolved over time; however, one area of the 
law that has been stymied is the application of modern United States welfare law in the context 
of immigration proceedings. In the United States, immigration law and child welfare law 
function in their own respective spheres. Currently, the United States relies on immigration law 
to adjudicate immigration proceedings and turns a shoulder to child welfare laws, even if 
children are involved in such proceedings. The United States federal government has provided 
care for at least 5,000 children of immigrants, having deported or detained their parents.
1
 The 
number is growing day by day. Between January and June of 2011, the United States deported 
more than 46,000 parents of citizen children.
2
 This figure illustrates the importance the role of 
children has in deportation proceedings that are taking place in the United States. Even more 
disturbing is the fact that many of these children are citizens of the United States, indicating that 
our immigration law fails to consider children and their best interests in this country’s 
immigration practices.  
Putting the problem into context, suppose that a citizen child is born to non-citizen 
parents. When that child turns eight, his non-citizen parent becomes detained and determined to 
be in the United States illegally. As a result, the parent becomes a detainee of the United States 
and the child becomes a ward of the State until immigration proceedings are complete. If the 
United States determines that the individual must be deported as a result of their illegal status, it 
seems just and fair to then consider the status of the child. Generally in these proceedings, the 
interests of the child are overlooked and immigration laws prevail. This result sends the parent to 
their home country with the child, if the parent is fit. What about the child’s interest as a United 
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States citizen? The child has a right to grow in America and be given a democratic opportunity, 
but has no avenue to express such interests.  
United States law is too rigid regarding these matters; the law has yet to develop a proper 
nexus between immigration law and child welfare law. Modern times call for a more flexible 
approach to handling immigration proceedings involving children. The movement away from 
parental rights and toward children’s autonomy suggests that the United States needs to 
reevaluate and reconstruct the manner in which immigration proceedings involving children are 
carried out.  In order to find a reasonable solution we must 1) evaluate United States immigration 
law; 2) evaluate United States child welfare law; and 3) find a compromise between each by 
analyzing international standards.  
 
Immigration Law in the United States 
 
In the United States, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227 regulates the deportation of aliens and is the 
primary statute explaining immigration removal proceedings. The section makes no reference to 
a child’s interest nor in anyway denotes the use of United States welfare laws in determining an 
alien’s child’s rights in deportation proceedings.3 Therefore, “under United States immigration 
law, children who are accompanied by non-citizen parents who are directly affected by 
immigration proceedings have no opportunity for their best interests to be considered.”4 In most 
instances, the determination by the court to deport a non-citizen parent results in the child being 
deported as well.
5
 Ultimately the choice lies with the parent(s) on whether to take the child with 
them or leave the child behind.
6
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United States immigration proceedings, however, do provide a means of escaping 
deportation for non-citizens in violation of 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), 
deportation may be terminated when there is a threat to an alien’s life or freedom.7 Again, the 
language used by the United States Congress fails to take into consideration any harm that may 
threaten a parent’s child. Courts have routinely dismissed arguments made, in lieu of 
§1231(b)(3), for the potential harm or threat to citizen children in a parent’s deportation 
proceeding. There does remain an escape route for parents who believe their children may suffer 
as a result of a deportation proceeding; however a rigorous standard must be satisfied. 8 
U.S.C.A. § 1229b provides that the United States Attorney General may cancel removal of an 
alien if: (1) the alien has resided in the United States for 5 or more years and has resided 
continuously for at least 7 years; (2) the alien has good moral character; (3) the alien has no 
convictions; and (4) removal will result in exceptional and extreme undue hardship to an alien’s 
spouse, parent, or child who is a United States citizen.
8
 The exception illustrates consideration 
for potential harms that may occur to a citizen child. But here, the statute dictates a burdening 
standard calling for exceptional and extreme hardship.
9
  
The Seventh Circuit in Sofinet v. INS, extended an exception to deportation when an alien 
is able to demonstrate (1) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable harm will 
occur if stay is denied; and (3) the potential harm to the movant outweighs the harm the INS will 
suffer.
10
 Most of the cases involving an exception to deportation require some type of physical 
persecution to oneself, meaning the alien must in fact be threatened. In these instances, it must be 
more likely than not that an individual’s life or freedom would be threatened because of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a group or political opinion.
11
 The burden of proof is always 
on the movant to demonstrate a clear probability that they will face some form of persecution.
12
 
 3 
Although the Court in Sofinet focused on physical persecution, the Sixth Circuit in Abay v. 
Ashcroft has considered an element of psychological persecution. Psychological persecution 
pertains to harm on a third party including an alien’s children.13 In Abay, the Court remanded 
deportation extending the Sofinet standard to include psychological persecution.
14
 The Court in 
Niang v. Gonzales, found that harm to a citizen child constitutes sufficient psychological harm 
that extends to the child’s alien parent.15 Here, the court extended the per se rule, stating that 
psychological harm cannot exist without the alien parent showing some form of accompanied 
harm. 
16
 As a result, the possibility of persecution to a child is irrelevant absent a showing of 
potential harm to the parent. Regarding similar circumstances, the Eighth Circuit has adopted the 
position that derivative claims cannot be brought for fear of a child’s persecution. The Fifth and 
Eleventh Circuits have taken the same stance. For example, the Fifth Circuit in Osigwe v. 
Ashcroft held, that alien parents “were ineligible for asylum under the general asylum 
provisions.”17 As for the Eleventh Circuit, the Court in Axmed v. Gonzales stated, “an alien 
parent who has no legal standing to remain in the United States, may not establish a derivative 
claim for asylum by pointing to the potential hardship of their American born children.”18 To 
further demonstrate the disparity amongst the Circuits, although a decision was not issued, the 
Ninth Circuit has shown movement toward the potential to protect children.
19
 In Abebe v. 
Gonzales, the Court supported the possibility for granting relief on derivative claims in 
remanding a case to consider the parent’s claim for asylum based on fear that their daughter 
would be subject to persecution if deported.
20
  
Although the Fourth and Sixth Circuits find psychological harm to a parent to derive 
from potential harm to citizen children; the Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuit’s limitations to 
apply the standard to only physical persecution demonstrates that the circuits are split on the 
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deportation exception.
21
 The Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Oforji v. Ashcroft furthers this split. 
There the Court found that an alien couldn’t bring derivative claims based on a child(ren)’s 
potential persecution to prevent deportation.
22
  There is a marked split amongst the Circuits that 
must be resolved. There is a need for consensus when one Circuit considers a child’s interest and 
another that fails to.
23
  
The Courts, regardless of the standard they apply, recognize the unfortunate dilemma set 
forth in immigration proceedings. For example, the Seventh Circuit acknowledges that non-
recognition of a child’s persecution may result in harm to that child, but is reluctant to allow 
claims because Congress has yet to provide an avenue to seek relief [absent decisions by the 
Attorney General to halt deportation].
24
 Congress has long taken the position that parental 
interests outweigh those of children in an immigration proceeding.
25
 For instance, if a parent is 
going to be deported, it is the parent(s) decision to take the child with them. Congress believes 
this outweighs the State’s interest in protecting the citizen child and breaking up the family unit. 
Courts realize that not all children are sufficiently represented in the immigration proceeding 
context. The Courts understand that children’s interests are visible when parent’s take an interest 
in the child and are seeking to protect the child as well as themselves. In this situation, Courts do 
not typically see a need to evaluate a child’s separate interest because the parent(s) acts on behalf 
of their child’s well being.26 A more concerning situation, in the Court’s opinion, is when a 
child’s parent(s) fails to represent their child’s best interest.27 In a sense, the child becomes 
invisible to the Court. It is this latter situation that beckons the need for a best interest of the 
child analysis in immigration deportation cases.
28
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Children’s Rights and Use of the Best Interest in Child Welfare Law 
 
 The discussion is this section refers to the application of child welfare laws to citizen 
children and its potential to play a role in an alien parent’s immigration proceeding. The United 
States welfare system has evolved into two overall considerations in its application of the law.
29
 
One aspect focuses on the protection of parental rights; the other is maintaining the individual 
rights of children.
30
 
 Older case law in the United States provides that parents once had the sole right to 
control the upbringing of their children. In cases such as Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters, the Supreme Court found that parental decisions are a liberty protected under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
31
 The opinions suggest that children are not "the mere creature[s] of the 
state."
32
 These early decisions assume that parents tend to care for their children and make 
decisions that benefit them.
33
 Further, the Courts found that there is an interest in maintaining 
familial relationships by having parents as sole decision makers.
34
 The Court’s aspiration was to 
prevent government intrusion into the privacy of the family unit. Court holdings that determine 
parental decision-making is in the best interest of the child ignore the fact that in some cases 
parents fail to consider their children’s best interest in the first place. Past Court decisions ere on 
the assumption that parents will always protect their child’s interest, without requiring that they 
actually do so.  
 The earlier Courts’ rulings allow for the interests of children to be ignored. These 
decisions recognize the interest the State has in its citizen children. Although early Courts 
focused on impeding government intrusion into the family, the impact was felt much further. In 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, the decision to allow parents to have a right to teach their children sheds 
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light on the idea that a child’s interest may not have been taken into consideration.35 Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, however, did conclude that children did not have a right to choose their education, their 
parents did. In this case the Court’s dissent noticed that by allowing parents, instead of State run 
schools, to teach children lacks a guarantee of furthering the State’s interest in teaching 
democratic values to its citizen children.
36
 The idea that allowing parents to teach what they wish 
may run afoul of a State’s interest became an issue. Promoting the growth of children in their 
understanding of democratic principles and disregarding a potential future interest in that child 
neglects the State’s interest in ensuring that children are given an opportunity. The State has an 
obligation to allow children to be able to develop in a society where democratic principles are 
prevalent. The State takes an interest in the growth of its citizens and children being raised in an 
unfit matter. This revelation has opened the door to a modern stance in child welfare law, 
focusing on the second consideration in welfare law; the child’s interest.  
 The movement towards granting children’s rights developed after the decision in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder. The idea that parental control could be a form of oppression began to 
emerge. Generally, a child does have a right to be free from adult control that does not serve their 
interest. The State has a role in furthering this principle by protecting children, specifically 
citizen children.
37
 Children’s rights soon included protection rights, right to be free from harm, 
rights to autonomy which results in the ability for one to have the right to make choice’s 
regarding their own life.
38
 In a movement away from old case law, the Court in Prince v. 
Massachusetts held that the State has an interest in the health and future of its citizen children.
39
 
As noted above, the State has an interest in teaching children the fundamental values of a 
democratic society.
40
 In Bethel v. Fraser, the Court notes the importance of school in its role in 
teaching children values essential for “citizenship in the Republic.”41 Further, in Mozert v. 
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Hawkins County Board Of Education the Court states that exposing children to liberal values and 
ideas are necessary for their future role as citizens.
42
 The Court in Mozert objected to parent’s 
disagreement with certain philosophies taught in a public school.
43
 The Court reasoned that not 
only would supporting the parent’s rights be harmful to the children, but also to the State.44  
The State’s prevailing interest in these contexts is that children become functioning 
members of a democratic society by instilling in them the principles that make such a society.
45
 
The idea of exposing children to diverse views is a means of ensuring that children become full 
citizens capable of interacting in a social, cultural and political context.
46
 In this same light, it has 
been argued that providing citizen children with these rights benefits the State as well. 
Progressive reformers suggest children’s duties are no longer obedience to parents, but instead 
preparation for citizenship. Citizenship, based on teaching of liberty and democratic principles, 
gives growth to our democracy. Progressives go as far as to argue that survival of the nation rests 
on the rights of children to be taught in a manner, which makes them functioning citizens of our 
society.
47
 The Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education explained that segregation 
undermined “the very foundation of good citizenship… and denial of educational opportunities 
denies children the tools necessary for their future role as citizens”.48 In a more recent case, 
Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court emphasized the importance of educational opportunities as critical 
in “sustaining our political and cultural heritage”.49  
 Citizen children born to alien parents may never be given such an opportunity absent a 
consideration of their best interests. In the cases mentioned, the Courts were determining welfare 
issues in the context of a citizen family. The reasoning set forth by the Courts above is absent in 
immigration proceedings involving alien parents and citizen children. It is not a matter of 
discussion because a child’s interest is never at stake when an immigration court is deciding 
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whether or not to deport a parent. In these matters, the parents are the ultimate deciders of 
whether their children will remain with them or stay in the United States. It is time that the 
immigration courts maintain the State’s interest in a child’s connection to America.  
In Nguyen v. INS, the court upheld the constitutionality of an immigration statute that 
confers citizenship on foreign children born to American mothers.
50
 Why would the State 
consider the interests of a non-citizen child’s connection to America more than its own citizen 
children? The system lacks coherence on this matter. Assuming that a maternal connection is so 
strong, the Court in Nguyen provides citizenship to children born to American mothers.
51
 It 
would only seem fair to maintain this connection between citizen children and their alien 
mothers if the goals of our government are to instill democratic values in children in lieu of what 
their parent’s aspirations are.52 “The State must guard not only [children’s] current liberty, but 
also their future liberty. It thus must deny all others, including parents, the right to deprive their 
young either of their basic liberty during immaturity, or their ability to develop the capacity to 
exercise their future liberty.”53 
It is clear that there is a conflict between parental and child’s rights in the welfare 
context. Citizen children, regardless of a parent’s status, are an interest of the State when the 
parent is unfit. In a deportation instance, when a parent is found to be fit or unfit the child is 
generally taken as a ward of the State because of their citizen status and the alien status of their 
parent. Ultimately the State has an interest in reunification in this context, absent some other 
showing of unfitness. Reunification preserves the family unit, which the State assumes is in the 
interest of both the parent and child. Children are dependent on their parents and many times 
reunification ensures that they can remain dependent until adulthood.
54
 A compelling reason in 
which the State supports reunification is that the State does not want to impede on family 
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relations. Too much State involvement, although it may provide independence for the child, may 
in fact deter the independence of the family as a whole and their ability to make sound decisions.  
Courts do recognize the position they are placed in when deciding to reunite a family. 
Many times deportation of a fit parent results in a child being sent to a poorer and less developed 
county. Although the State shows an interest [in domestic welfare cases] of ensuring that a child 
is raised on democratic principles; they fail to go as far as to divide a family when a parent is 
being deported to a country that will never provide an American child with these teachings.
55
 
Courts generally support reunification, but have determined that sending a child to harm’s way 
may reason to keep children from their parents. The Court determined in Olowo v. Ashcroft, that 
reunification was not proper when an alien mother intended to return to Nigeria with her child 
because the child was possibly going to suffer female genital mutilation in that country.
56
 This 
case illustrates the major complications involving immigration proceedings. If the child was not 
under the State’s welfare system, the mother would have taken the child and likely not spoke of 
the child’s interest against persecution in Nigeria. Here, the interest of the child was considered 
in light of the mother’s failure to object to the harm that would have occurred if she had been 
deported.
57
 Immigration proceedings lack any insight into the child’s interest, absent a case like 
Olowo, when a child that is taken and spoken for by the State.  
 
Policy Considerations In Examining A Child’s Best Interest 
 
 Reunification is the most prevalent result in immigration proceedings. However, the 
Olowo case sheds light on the importance of considering a child’s well being when determining 
whether to allow their parents to make all decisions and speak on their child’s behalf.58 In the 
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context of recognizing a child’s interest, there are important policy considerations that must be 
taken into account. First and foremost is inquiring about the child’s current and future health.59 
As was the case in Olowo, the child’s future health was in question if they ended up reunited 
with their mother and sent to Nigeria.
60
 Physical health is a consideration that becomes apparent 
in analyzing the facts of each case, however a more elusive health factor is the impact on a 
child’s mental health. Determining which is less detrimental to the mental health of a child is 
difficult task to assign to a judge deciding whether to deport an alien parent. What has less of a 
negative impact on the child; separation, deportation to a less developed country, or being raised 
under the State’s welfare system? Furthermore, the developmental heath of the child is also at 
issue. Is growing up separated from their parent more beneficial to development than being 
raised in a country where poverty and low literacy rates prevail? These considerations must be 
made on a case by case basis, but the number of factors that must be taken into account show that 
a child’s interest are important and should matter in determining whether to deport an alien 
parent and allow their child to follow that same path.  
 Another policy matter that plays a key role in this context is jus soli.
61
 Jus soli is applied 
in American law and confers automatic citizenship on children who are born on United States 
soil despite a parent’s undocumented or alien status.62 This doctrine places Courts in the 
predicament of occasionally abandoning American citizens when parents must be deported. If, 
for policy matters we eliminate this practice, the issue of determining whether or not to keep 
citizen children in the United States or allow them to  reunite with their parents becomes moot. 
Children would be assumed to be the citizenship of their parents and determinations to reunite 
would not be necessary because the issue of protecting the State interest in citizens would be 
non-existent.  
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 Reconsideration of jus soli has garnered much attention over the recent years. The 
increase of illegal immigrants entering the United States to give birth to “anchor babies” has 
become a major problem.
63
 The term, “anchor baby”, describes a child born on American soil, 
which upon reaching the age of twenty-one can sponsor the immigration of family.
64
 The child 
serves as the anchor in order to achieve the purpose of admitting family to the United States 
based on his jus soli citizenship.
65
 Suggestions to reform jus soli citizenship include amending 
birth right citizenship to only include children born to citizen parents.
66
 This change could be 
remarkably influential in cases regarding deportation. Consideration, in this context, would no 
longer have to be given to children born of alien parents. It would simplify proceedings, only 
needing to consider the parents’ deportation status. The State would no longer retain an interest 
in an alien’s child because law would no longer deem them a citizen; they would lose it at birth 
because of their parent’s non-citizen status. A policy change would in a sense create a United 
States born “alien” status that would receive no rights of an American citizen although they were 
born here. There are large implications of implementing a policy of this nature. A classification 
of this sort would apply predominantly to immigrant mothers of a minority race, raising the 
possibility of racial discrimination issues.
67
 On the other end of the spectrum, the handling of 
immigration deportation proceedings become more just as applied to children. Use of the best 
interest standard and determining whether to break up a family would not need to be considered, 
making judgments less harsh. However, there does exist an immigrant who retains asylum in the 
United States seeking a better way of life for their children and relies on jus soli to ensure that 
their children are granted American citizenship. Does the United States government have an 
obligation to those that seek to live in a democratic society? For a nation founded on liberty and 
freedom a drastic change to jus soli may be unjust and run against the foundations of our nation. 
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A policy change of this sort would be a drastic change and one that does not seem plausible. 
Becoming an American citizen is a wish many seek to have fulfilled and eliminating jus soli 
would seem contrary to protecting the integrity of American citizenship. The effects would likely 
give rise to other citizenship issues and create more problems. The positive impact would only 
apply to a miniscule portion of immigration law.  
 The lack of considering a child’s best interest in immigration proceedings generally 
occurs in situations unlike that of Owolo.
68
 Many cases involve children who are never a ward of 
the State, whom don’t have the State to speak on their behalf. Our judicial system must find a 
medium in this realm of the law. A nexus that considers both the child and the interest of the 
State in deporting illegal aliens must be found. In order to find an appropriate resolution, insight 
must be taken from positions taken around the world regarding children in immigration 
proceedings. In order to create a more reasonable system in the United States, our government 
needs to integrate these international principles into the way immigration proceedings are 
handled at home.  
 
Attempting to Find A Sensible Solution 
  
 There must be a change in the way immigration proceedings handle children and their 
interests in the United States. Application of a best interest of the child standard used in United 
States welfare cases must be used when courts are deciding whether or not to deport an alien 
with citizen children. Conclusions drawn from above indicate that there is currently a split 
amongst the Courts on whether to consider a child’s interest. Some Courts are willing to hear 
derivative claims on the basis of harm to children during deportation, while others are not. In 
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America, no child’s interest is given consideration [absent a parent’s interest of that child] in 
deportation cases where no apparent harm exists.
69
  
 Examining international law provides insight into how these situations are handled in a 
more reasonable and sensible matter. The Convention on the Rights of the Child was formed to 
ensure that children are protected under humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law.
70
 The 
Convention was developed by the standards set forth in the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of the Child which introduced the idea that, “the best interests of the child shall be the 
paramount consideration.”71 The Convention states, “No child shall be deprived of his or her 
liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily.”72 Further the Convention seeks to protect a child’s right to: (1) 
physical and legal protection; (2) remain united with their parent(s); (3) care and assistance of 
developmental needs; (4) participate in decisions regarding their future; (5) means of 
reunification. The protections the Convention seeks to achieve are the basic principles that need 
to be examined when deciding the fate of children in a United States’ immigration proceeding.73 
These factors help to provide a basic framework to allow Courts to make appropriate decisions 
with the interests of children in mind. However, the United States has failed to ratify the 
Convention and thus has no obligation under customary international law to abide by them. 
Perhaps it is time for the United States to take a stance in protecting not only children’s interest; 
but also children who are citizen’s interest as well.74 The United States reluctance to ratify this 
treaty suggests that the United States is more concerned with relocating children without first 
analyzing a child’s rights. The United States considers children in the context of non-
immigration matters, but has yet to show any movement toward applying the standard any 
further.  
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The United States should apply these standards in welfare matters because they did sign 
onto the Convention, which sets forth, “in all actions concerning children whether undertaken by 
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative 
bodies, the best interest of the child shall be primary consideration.”75 A plain reading of this 
principle infers that the United States, as a signatory, has an obligation to protect the interests of 
children taken under the State’s welfare system, however there is no mention that a citizen of the 
nation must be protected when their parents are being deported. Because the child is not a ward 
of the State and the parents interest reign supreme in an immigration context, the United States 
does not need to oblige to these international standards. However, these principles should be read 
as universal and applying to any situation involving children. The adoption of these principles by 
the Convention on the Right of the Child indicates that the best interest standard is more 
universal than the United Nations intended. The United States reluctance to ratify the Convention 
demonstrates their ignorance of international standards and turning a cold shoulder to the 
interests of citizen children during immigration proceedings.  
 Direct application of these principles is demonstrated in Canadian law.
76
 In Canada, the 
best interest of the child approach is incorporated in its immigration proceedings. The United 
States and Canada have similar immigration history and have immigration systems that resemble 
one another. Protection under the Canadian best interest approach should be paralleled in United 
States immigration proceedings. In addition to considering the principles set forth in protecting a 
child’s rights, Canada goes one step further in providing a child with a best interests 
representative.
77
 The representative acts on behalf of the child in an immigration proceeding 
involving an alien parent.
78
 In Canada, an alien can request permanent residency through a 
humanitarian and compassionate relief application.
79
 When the request is reviewed the decision-
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makers must take into consideration “the best interests of the child directly affected.”80 This 
process has provided a standard to which courts in Canada apply the best interest approach.
81
 
Courts in Canada consider the benefit to the child of the parent’s deportation from Canada as 
well as the hardship the child may suffer from their parent’s removal or their departure to the 
parent’s domicile.82 Applying the Canadian model in United States can address many of the 
difficult issues in the cases that were earlier discussed. Appointment of a representative 
eliminates the problem of a child’s rights being invisible when a parent fails to represent their 
child’s interests. In addition, it provides access to be heard in proceedings where the child 
generally would have no input into the court’s determinations.83 The Canadian system enables 
children to have a voice and to have their interests heard. It takes into consideration the 
developmental interests of the child, the parent’s expectations, as well as the State’s interest in 
protecting its citizens. An attempt to mirror the Canadian system has been developed as an 
advocacy project in the United States. The Immigrant Children’s Advocacy Project has been 
established to provide children with guardian ad litem.
84
 The mission of the Project is to 
“identify and give voice to the child best interests while he or she is subject to an immigration 
proceeding.”85 Although not all children are represented in their parent’s proceedings, the 
establishment of a program of this kind demonstrates the need to recognize the interest of 
children in an immigration setting. The advocates of this program act as a liaison in the legal 
system, meeting with the child at least once per week helping the child understand the process 
and explaining the consequences of the decisions that will be made.
86
  
 In order to effectively implement a more just policy concerning children in the United 
States, the international standards above should be used as a guiding tool. In addition, one way to 
correct the problem would be through the actions of the legislature. Modifying the immigration 
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exceptions is a means in which Congress could better protect non-citizen parents and their 
children. Decreasing the minimum number of years necessary to be in the country as well as 
lessening the “extreme hardship” standard will allow parents to be given the opportunity to 
remain in the country and allow their children to be provided the opportunities they deserve as 
citizens of the United States. Further, Congressional attempts to pursue the ratification of the 
Convention on the Rights of Children may work in persuading the executive to ratify and 
implement the standards set forth therein. Ratification would oblige the United States to follow 
the standards set forth in the Convention and ensure that children’s rights are considered not only 
in all welfare matters but in immigration proceedings as well.  
 Another avenue that should be given high regard is paralleling the procedures undertaken 
by Canada. Permitting or assigning a representative to serve the interest of children would ease 
many of the issues with the representation of a child. A means of establishing a resource such as 
the Immigrant Children’s Advocacy Project will provide ample opportunity for children’s 
interests to be expressed.
87
 In addition, advocates serve a child’s interest by taking consideration 
such things as foster care (if needed), educational services, legal services (beyond the 
immigration context), therapeutic services, medical care, religious support, nutritional well 
being, access to communication networks, access to interpreters and recreational programs; to 
name a few.
88
 In effect, the program exceeds representing a child’s best interest. Perhaps 
implementing this amount of guidance would be too burdensome in its initial establishment, but 
the Project serves as a positive guide towards a better approach to handling children’s interest in 
immigration proceedings in the United States. The pilot project can help pave the way for future 
programs that can be created for citizen children whose parents are in the middle of an 
immigration proceeding. Although the State takes an interest in its citizens in welfare 
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proceedings, it lacks when a fit parent is being deported. Providing a guardian ad litem program 
would fill the gap necessary to protect a child’s rights in this setting.  
The prevailing idea of reunification runs supreme to the voice of a child’s interest in the 
courtroom. Providing a child with independent legal counsel allows for that representative to 
serve and openly voice the interest of that child. It is a sufficient means of providing the court 
with reasons on why a child should not be deported in light of their parent’s deportation. Instead 
of allowing a parent to speak on behalf of the child’s interest, the direct interests of the child can 
be expressed and developed in front of a court, which must determine the fate of that child. The 
application of the best interest standard should be applied in both the welfare and immigration 
context. Applying the standard maintains that a citizen child’s rights remain intact and ultimately 
maintains the idea of familial unification.  
 The entire system needs to be revamped. Instead of having two distinct areas of law, 
there could be developed a hybrid system in the context of immigration proceedings involving 
citizen children; an immigration welfare court. A system of this nature provides courts the ability 
to take into consideration all the parties affected by an immigration proceeding. By paving a new 
avenue for proceedings to be heard, the establishment of case law and bright line rules regarding 
families and immigration proceedings can be developed. This would ensure a structured manner 
of achieving the goals and interest of the State, parents, and children. However, the policy 
concerns surrounding setting up a new court would be a major issue. There lacks a precedential 
resort to rely on in both establishing the court and administering its decisions. Administratively, 
issues would arise from the logistical tasks of establishing such a system. In addition, the 
feasibility of setting up proceedings of this nature would be a major problem. The fact that the 
system could provide an avenue for fraud is a real threat. If children’s interests must always be 
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considered then the reason for aliens to procreate for their benefit would likely occur. This would 
be in direct conflict with the reasons why establishing such a system are necessary. The potential 
issues that arise appear to heavily outweigh the establishment of a new means of handling 
immigration proceedings. It is more sensible to find a middle ground in established case law and 
correct our current system rather than create a new way of dealing with immigration affairs 
involving children.  
 
Conclusion 
  
 The United States’ separation of immigration proceedings and child welfare systems has 
led to the abandonment of citizen children’s rights. The archaic system neglects children who 
may suffer deportation as a result of their parent’s status in the country. Although children’s 
interest are generally considered by their parents, the inability of a child to express their rights 
and interests are lost in the current way the United States handles immigration proceedings. The 
current split amongst the Circuits indicates that the system needs to be reevaluated.  
The strict rules that are followed in the immigration courts do not parallel the best 
interests standards used when children are considered in the welfare context. Although many 
children in immigration proceedings are citizens, they are not provided the same opportunities 
that citizen children receive when there is a welfare offense involving a citizen parent. As a 
result, the entire system needs to be integrated and developed in accordance to principles set 
forth internationally. By examining both the Convention on the Rights of the Child and practices 
in Canada, the United States can reform immigration proceedings to be handled in way that 
provides children a voice.
89
 Implementing a system that allows children’s interests to be heard 
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helps to achieve the goals of the State. It will provide an avenue to determine whether it is in the 
best interest of the child to remain at home and be given the rights of an American citizen to 
grow under democratic values, or whether it is proper to deport children because it is in their 
interest to remain with their parents. The system can be reformed and it is time for a change, a 
child’s voice although soft can have a huge impact on how their life pans out.   
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